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Abstract
Evidence is growing that forms of incivility–e.g. aggressive and disrespectful behaviors,
harassment, hate speech and outrageous claims–are spreading in the population of social
networking sites’ (SNS) users. Online social networks such as Facebook allow users to reg-
ularly interact with known and unknown others, who can behave either politely or rudely.
This leads individuals not only to learn and adopt successful strategies for using the site,
but also to condition their own behavior on that of others. Using a mean field approach, we
define anevolutionary game framework to analyse the dynamics of civil and uncivil ways of
interaction in online social networks and their consequences for collective welfare. Agents
can choose to interact with others–politely or rudely–in SNS, or to opt out from online social
networks to protect themselves from incivility. We find that, when the initial share of the
population of polite users reaches a critical level, civility becomes generalized if its payoff
increases more than that of incivility with the spreading of politeness in online interactions.
Otherwise, the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with online incivility can lead
the economyto non-socially optimal stationary states. JEL Codes: C61, C73, D85, O33,
Z13. PsycINFO Codes: 2240, 2750.
Introduction
There is growing evidence that “online incivility” is spreading across social networking sites
(SNS) making them a potentially hostile environment for users ([1]–[3]). The definition of
incivility has been long debated by communication scholars ([4]). In their study about televised
incivility, [5] referred to it as the violation of well-established face-to-face social norms for the
polite expression of opposing views. To the purpose of our study, we define online incivility as
a manner of offensive interaction that can range from aggressive commenting in threads,
incensed discussion and rude critiques, to outrageous claims, hate speech and harassment.
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The Pew Research Center (PRC) has documented the rising incidence of incivility in SNS-
based interactions: for example, 73% of online adults have seen someone being harassed in
some way in SNS, and 40% have personally experienced it. 49% of SNS-using adults have seen
other users behaving cruelly, 60% witnessed someone being called offensive names, and 53%
had seen efforts to purposefully embarrass someone. 92% of Internet users agreed that SNS-
mediated interaction allows people to be more rude and aggressive, compared with their offline
experiences ([2]). The Facebook “Pages” and the Twitter accounts of actors of public interest
such as political parties, magazines, and celebrities provide a typical setting for online incivility
([3]). In these settings, SNS users can randomly interact with strangers who subscribed to the
same feed. Even if subscribersmay have specific interests in common, they are likely to be het-
erogeneous in terms of personal traits, preferences, and modes of social interaction ([6]–[8]).
Interaction in SNS leads individuals to condition their behavior on the behavior of other
users, in a strategic manner. For example, users may react to a hostile online environment
where incivility is prevalent by in turn behaving rudely, or by abandoning the social network.
We study the evolution of online and offline social interaction in a mean field evolutionary
game framework where individuals can choose whether to be polite or not when interacting
with others in SNS. Everyone also has the option of opting out from SNS to cope with the pos-
sible hostility of the online environment.
We model a homogeneous population, where individuals have the same access to technolo-
gies, but can pursue three different strategies of social interaction: 1) using SNS and behaving
politely in online interactions; 2) using SNS and behaving in an uncivil way in online interac-
tions; 3) opting out from SNS. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that departing SNS users
reduce their social participation to the minimum amount of face-to-face interactions that are
inevitably required in everyday life (e.g. the line at the supermarket and the interaction with
the cashier). This strategy can be interpreted as a form of self-protective behavior, which
emerges when the combined hostility of the virtual social environments that surround the indi-
vidual prompts a drastic form of adaptation consisting in the withdrawal from any significant
(offline or online) interaction with others. We define the equilibrium in which all individuals
choose social isolation as a “social poverty trap” ([9]).
The analysis of dynamics shows that the spreading of self-protective behaviors triggered by
online incivility entails undesirable results to the extent to which it leads the economy to non-
socially optimal stationary states that are Pareto dominated by others. For individuals, self-pro-
tective behaviors are rational in that they temporarily provide higher payoffs. However, their
spreading causes a generalized decrease in the payoffs associated with each social participation
strategy, which, in the long run, leads the economy to a non-optimal stationary state. The social
poverty trap is always a locally attractive Nash equilibrium.When the other stationary states
are attractive, they always give higher payoffs than the social poverty trap.
Our contribution bridges three literatures. The first literature is that of economists and
political scientists who empirically analyzed how Internet use may impact on aspects of social
capital such as face-to-face interactions and well-being (e.g. [10]–[13]). Our study contributes
to this literature by introducing the problem of online incivility and providing the theoretical
analysis of how the evolution of offline and online interactions can impact collective welfare.
Our focus on social poverty traps is also related to previous economic and sociological stud-
ies that analyzed how economic growth and technological progress may cause a decline in face-
to-face social interactions ([14]–[15]), and to the literature concerning the “decline of commu-
nity life thesis” ([16]).
The second body of literature comprises physicists and economists studying evolutionary
games on networks, both theoretically and experimentally. Several authors have analyzed the
topological structure of interactions in networks in an evolutionary game framework (starting
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from the seminal work of Nowak and May [17], a large literature grew. For a review see [18],
[19] or [20]. For the specific contribution of economic thinking to this debate see, for example,
[21]–[22]). We aim to add to this literature by building a mean field evolutionary framework to
model the interactions that users regularly and randomly have with known and unknown oth-
ers adopting different strategies of interaction in SNS. We also relate to the literature about vol-
untary participation, or opting-out, which proved to be a mechanisms fostering cooperation in
networks (see, for example, [23]–[24]). In our case, instead of a complete opting out from the
game, we model the possibility of a partial opting out from the sole SNS relationships.
The third body of literature is that of psychologists and computer scientists who have ana-
lyzed the impact of SNS use on social capital and well-being (e.g. [25]–[27]).
The decline in social engagement
In his best seller Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam [14] documented that a decline in measures of
social capital–such as participation in formal organisations, informal social connectedness, and
interpersonal trust–began in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, with a sharp accelera-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s.
Putnam’s “decline of community life thesis” ([16]) prompted a number of subsequent
empirical tests. [28] used a number of different sources to assess the development of social cap-
ital in the United States since 1952. The authors found a decline in indicators of volunteering,
membership of organisations and entertainment with friends and relatives. Based on GSS data,
[29] found a declining trend in indicators of social connectedness and confidence in institu-
tions in the United States between 1975 and 2002.
Apart from the United States, there seems to be a common pattern of declining trust, social
engagement and organisational activity across industrialiseddemocracies starting from the
1980s, with the exception of Scandinavian countries ([30]). Declining trends of indicators of
social interaction have been documented for England andWales over the period 1972–99
([31]), Great Britain over 1980–2000 ([32]), China ([33]) and Australia over 1960–90 ([34]).
Putnam [14] discussed three main explanations for the decline in American social capital:
1) the reduction in the time available for social interaction–related to the need to work more,
to the rise in labour flexibility and to the increase in commuting time in urban areas; 2) the rise
in mobility of workers and students; and 3) technology and mass media.
In the last decade, Putnam’s arguments have found support in a number of studies investi-
gating the effect exerted on various dimensions of social connectedness by the rise in working
time ([35]), labour mobility ([36]), urban sprawl and commuting ([37]), and the impoverish-
ment of the social environment, which can prompt individuals to pursue isolation ([9]).
[9] modelled the decline in social engagement as the result of a self-protective reaction to the
reduction in the time available for social activities, the decline in social participation opportuni-
ties and the rise of materialistic values. According to the authors, the need to “defend” oneself
from an unfriendly environment where social engagement becomes increasingly less rewarding
prompts the substitution of relational goods with private goods in individual preferences,
thereby favouring social isolation. Social isolation can be interpreted as a particular form of self-
defense through which individualsmake their utility independent from the actions of others.
For example, individuals choosing social isolation tend to watch a movie alone through a home
theatre system instead of going to the cinema with friends. They may even prefer to renounce
their leisure activities to devote all of the available time to work. In this way, their payoffs do not
vary with the closing of theatres or with the decline in the number (or even the unavailability) of
friends with whom to share a night at the cinema. This shift in preferences is not driven by
mutating tastes. Rather, as explained by Hirsch [38], it must be interpreted as a self-protective
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reaction to the deterioration of the social environment. Hirsch was the first to introduce the
concept of defensive consumption choices in his seminal work on the social limits to growth.
This kind of consumption occurs in response to a change in the physical or social environment:
“If the environment deteriorates, for example, through dirtier air or more crowded roads, then a
shift in resources to counter these “bads” does not represent a change in consumer tastes but a
response, on the basis of existing tastes, to a reduction in net welfare” ([38], p. 63).
The rise in SNS-mediated interaction
In Bowling Alone [14], Putnam argued that progress in information technology could further
exacerbate the decline in community life. At the time, Putnam referred to the negative role of
television and other forms of technology-basedentertainment such as video players and video-
games. Early Internet studies reprised Putnam’s arguments suggesting that the Internet might
displace even more social activities than television ([39]). The displacement hypothesis was
supported by the first empirical tests of the relationship between Internet use and face-to-face
interactions (e.g. [40]–[41]).
These explorations, however, were carried out before the rise of SNS, when using the Inter-
net was predominantly a solitary activity with limited relational implications. Today, Internet
use is closely related to engagement in online social networks (hereafter we will use the terms
social networking sites and online social network as synonyms for the sake of brevity).
According to the Pew Research Center (PRC) Internet & American Life Project Survey, as
of September 2014, 71 per cent of online adults were active on Facebook, 23 per cent used Twit-
ter, 28 per cent used Pinterest and 26 per cent used Instagram ([42]).
These Figures mark a dramatic increase from 2009, when the PRC first began collecting
data on Internet use. At that time, 46 per cent of online adults had ever used a SNS ([43]).
Despite the extent of this transformation, the economic research on online networks is limited.
In the fields of social psychology and communication science, several authors have tackled the
potential role of SNS in face-to-face interaction in small samples of students in American col-
leges ([25]–[26], [44]).
In economics, a few studies empirically assessed the role of broadband on aspects of social
capital and political participation but, due to a lack of data, they could not tackle the possible
role of online social networks. Based on German Socio-EconomicPanel data, [13] found that
having broadband Internet access at home has positive effects on individuals’ social interac-
tions, manifesting in a higher frequency of visiting theatres, opera and exhibitions, and in a
higher frequency of visiting friends. Using data on Italian municipalities, [11] found that the
diffusion of broadband led, initially, to a significant decline in electoral turnout in national par-
liamentary elections. This was reversed in the 2013 elections when the first round took place
after the explosive rise of SNS. [10] found that the progressive increase in DSL availability sig-
nificantly decreased voter turnout in Germanmunicipalities.
[45] theoretically analysed the evolution of social participation and the accumulation of
social capital in relation to technological progress and online networking. Their results suggest
that, under certain conditions, the stock of information and social ties accumulated within
online networks can create an infrastructure that helps individuals to develop their social par-
ticipation despite space and time constraints.
Overall, the evidence suggests that face-to-face and SNS-mediated interactionmay be com-
plementary, rather than one substituting the other. On the other hand, there is evidence that,
despite the steep rise in the use of SNS, a decreasing yet still remarkable share of online adults
chooses not to use or even to abandon them (see for example [46], for the U.S. and [47], for
Italy).
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The problem of online incivility
The rise of SNS-mediated interaction has been accompanied by the emergence of new, unex-
pected, downsides. Anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggests that interaction in online social
networks has increasingly been plagued by online incivility ([1],[2]). The roots of incivility in
SNS-mediated social interactions have been addressed in a few psychological studies, which
suggest that, when it comes to the presentation of opposing views and opinions, there is a fun-
damental difference between face-to-face and Internet-mediated interactions.
In contrast to online conversations, face-to-face interactions entail the use of expressions,
smiles, eye contact, tone of voice, gesturing, and other nonverbal behavior that makes it easier
to correctly perceive the interlocutors’ feelings and intentions. Online conversations, on the
other hand, are more vulnerable to incomprehension and misunderstandings. In SNS-medi-
ated interactions, interlocutors are basically ‘invisible’ and their feelings and sensitivities can
hardly be perceived. As stated by [48] in an early study on computer-mediated communica-
tion, “Communicators must imagine their audience, for at a terminal it almost seems as though
the computer itself is the audience. Messages are depersonalized, inviting stronger or more
uninhibited text and more assertiveness in return”. [48] observed that computer-mediated
communication entails anonymity, reduced self-regulation, and reduced self-awareness. “The
overall weakening of self or normative regulationmight be similar to what happens when peo-
ple become less self-aware and submerged in a group, that is, deindividuated” (p. 1126). Dein-
dividuation has in turn been found to be conducive to disinhibition and lack of restraint ([49]).
As a result, while in physical interactions people usually think twice before behaving offen-
sively with a person who expresses an opposing view, SNS users are likely to care less about the
risk of offending others in online conversations. In a pioneering experiment comparing face-
to-face and online conversations, [50] found that people in computer-mediated groups were
more aggressive than they were in face-to-face groups. In general, they were more responsive
to immediate textual cues, more impulsive and assertive, and less bound by precedents set by
societal norms of how to behave in groups. Based on survey data collected in a big U.S. com-
pany, [51] found that computer-mediated communication has substantial deregulating effects
and encourages disinhibition in respect to non-mediated interactions.
Further studies suggested that a more impulsive and assertive behavior that does not con-
sider the recipients’ feelings is far more common in Internet-mediated discussions as compared
to face-to-face encounters ([52]). This phenomenon has been conceptualized as “flaming”
([50]). It refers to the expression of strong and uninhibited opinions, consisting of extreme
emotional behavior expressed through uninhibited speech (insulting, offending, hostile com-
ments, etc.).
The experimental studies mentioned above were conducted in very limited networks that
were created ad hoc by researchers. It is reasonable to argue that in large networks such as
Facebook and Twitter deindividuation and, therefore, disinhibition are likely to be exacerbated.
Recent studies on Facebook have shown that controversial content was more frequent than any
prosocial content categories, suggesting that there is an overrepresentation of negative content
on the platform ([53]). A further distinctive element of interaction in big online networks is
that possible reactions to provocative behaviours can be easily neutralized, for example by sim-
ply switching off the device, or even by ‘blocking’ the interlocutor through the network’s pri-
vacy settings. These ‘exit options’ probably further weaken inhibitions and self-regulation ([3]).
By contrast, one cannot easily withdraw from an unpleasant face-to-face discussion.
The problem of incivility is important because the infringement of social norms for the
polite expression of opposing views can provoke emotional and behavioral responses with rele-
vant economic and political consequences. [5] experimentally analyzed the impact of incivility
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in mediated communication on trust. The authors noted a fundamental difference between
face-to-face and television-mediated discussions about political views. Television-mediated
presentations of opposing opinions often violate face-to-face social norms and easily deviate
from civility. [5] collected experimental evidence that witnessing televised incivility causes a
loss of trust in others. The authors claimed that, when social norms of politeness are violated in
televised debates, watchers might feel hurt as if they personally experienced the offences they
saw on TV. [54] argued that when incivility takes place in SNS-mediated interactions, users’
feelings might be affected as if the offences where perpetrated in real life. In respect to what
may happen with televised incivility, witnessing online incivility entails a more intense emo-
tional involvement not only because one can be personally targeted with offensive behaviors
but also because when others are being offended in online environments there is a concrete
possibility to intervene in their defense. Based on Italian survey data, [54] found that SNS users
have significantly lower levels of trust in strangers, in neighbors, and in institutions than non-
users and that such a decline in trust may be detrimental for users’ well-being. The use of SNS
could cause a decline in trust through different mechanisms, some of which have already been
mentioned: for instance, increased awareness of diversity, experience of new social norms and
more frequent exposure to incivility as compared to face-to-face interactions. Overall, the evi-
dence regarding online incivility suggests that SNS can easily become a hostile environment for
users and prompts the need to analyze two different strategies of social interaction via SNS,
based on the propensity for acting civilly or not.
Model and Methods
We assume that agents can choose between two different ways of social involvement: 1) Active
social involvement, entailing the development of interpersonal relationship both by means of
face-to-face and SNS-mediated interactions. 2) Limited social involvement, entailing the opting
out from SNS and the maintenance of the minimum amount of face-to-face interactions that
are required for the completion of everyday life task, such as, for example, the interaction with
the cashier at the supermarket and limited on-the-job interactions.
In addition, socially active agents who do not opt out from online social networks can also
choose to behave either politely or rudely in SNS-mediated interactions.
In detail the strategies resulting from these possible choices are as follows:
1. Strategy H: social relations are developed both by means of face-to-face interactions and via
social networking sites. SNS users who chooseH (for Hate) behave online in an uncivil way.
For example, these agents indulge in offensive and disrespectful behaviors, incensed discus-
sions and rude critiques, outrageous claims and hate speech.
2. Strategy P: agents who follow this strategy develop their social relations both by means of
face-to-face interactions and via SNS. In contrast toH players, however, P players behave
politely in online interactions.We call this strategy P (for Polite).
3. Strategy N: agents following this strategy choose to withdraw from SNS-mediated relations
and reduce face-to-face relations to the minimum.We label this strategy as N (for No SNS
participation) and we call the equilibrium in which all individuals play N a “social poverty
trap” ([9]). The withdrawal from SNS interactions modeledwith theN strategymay be
viewed as a drastic form of adaptation to the hostility of the environment that makeN play-
ers’ payoff constant and completely independent from the behavior of others.
We first notice that theN strategy is a sort of opting out strategy. As discussed in the intro-
duction, these kinds of strategy have been proved useful to foster cooperation in social
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dilemmas. However, contrary to standard opt out strategies, here agents playing N remain in
the game but choose a “lower” level of interaction.When a P or aH agent switches to theN
strategy, she breaks SNS connections with other people, while when an agent switches fromN
to P orH strategy, she creates SNS connections.
In each instant of time t, individuals interact with many others. The interactions betweenH
and P individuals take place both face to face and via SNS. Those in whichN agents are
involved are reduced to the minimum face-to-face encounters needed.
Payoffs
Let us indicate by x1(t), x2(t) and x3(t) the shares of individuals adopting strategiesH, P, and N,
respectively, at time t. It holds xi(t) 0, all i, and
X
i
x1ðtÞ ¼ 1, therefore the vector x(t) =
(x1(t), x2(t), x3(t)) belongs to the three-dimensional simplex S represented in Fig 1.
We assume that each agent interacts with agents of different types contemporarily. We call
xjðtÞ ¼ ðxj1ðtÞ; x
j
2ðtÞ; x
j
3ðtÞÞ the vector of shares of the different strategies played by the sub-
population of agents with whom the individual j is matched at each instant of time t. Then we
assume that the payoff Pji that each agent j gets from playing strategy i depends on x
j(t),
Pjiðx
jðtÞÞ.
Following standard mean field analysis, we assume that the types of agents an individual
can meet in her social interactions reflects the average composition of the population. Thus, at
each time t, each agent has neighbors of different types according to shares x1(t), x2(t), x3(t).
This is a standard assumption in the economic analysis of complex networks (see, for example,
[55]–[56]), which allows us to better focus on how changes in average population shares affect
the payoff and the adoption dynamics of strategies. More specifically, we are interested in ana-
lyzing the adoption of the opting out strategyN, rather than in the effects that the specific com-
position of neighborhoodshave. While the specific topological structure of the interactions
plays a decisive role in shaping some features of the dynamics (see [18]–[20]), this simplifica-
tion allows us to obtain a complete classification of the dynamics and to determine the average
effects of the different population shares on the stationary state.
Consequently Pjiðx
jðtÞÞ ¼ PiðxðtÞÞ, that is the payoff of playing a given strategy is indepen-
dent of the specific identity of the player and just depends on the population shares and on the
strategy played.
The strategic context of the game is illustrated by the following payoff matrix representing
the payoffs of row-players whenmeeting a homogenous set of agents playing column strategy.
meets only H meets only P meets only N
H b g 0
P   d ε 0
N Z Z Z
When a row player meets a heterogeneous set of agents, then her payoffs are derived by the
convex linear combination of payoffs whose weights are the population shares. Consider first
H and P strategies:
PHðx1; x2Þ ¼ bx1 þ gx2
PPðx1; x2Þ ¼   dx1 þ εx2
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Fig 1. The two-dimensional simplex S in the space (x1, x2, x3). The points (x1, x2, x3) = (1, 0, 0), (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 1, 0), and (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 0, 1)
correspond, respectively, to the vertices H^, P^, and N^, where all individuals play, respectively, strategies H, P, and N. Along the edge joining H^ and P^
(respectively, H^ and N^, P^ and N^) the strategy N (respectively, P, H) is not played.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164286.g001
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Notice that, with this specification, the payoffs do not depend on the number of interactions
each agent has (and thus on the degree of each agent in the network), but on the shares of strat-
egies in own neighborhood.
The payoff of theN strategy is assumed to be constant and, therefore, it does not depend on
the distribution (x1, x2, x3) of strategies:
PN ¼ Z
We assume δ, ε, η> 0. The strict positivity of η characterizesN as a self-protective strategy:
in a context where no one engages in social interactions,N becomes the best performing strat-
egy. We also assume that the payoff from virtuous social interactions (i.e. adopting strategy P)
is increasing in the proportion of people interacting in such a way (ε is positive). Finally, we
assume the impact of the diffusion of the “hate” strategy on a polite’s payoff is always negative
(δ is positive).
We instead allow the parameters β and γ to be either positive or negative. It is not clear, in
fact, whether haters get more satisfaction when dealing with polite SNS users or by confronting
with others of the same type. AnH player, for example, may find the interaction with a polite
player who defuses provocations with kindness less rewarding; accordingly, we allowH players
to get disutility from the interaction with a polite person. Or, by contrast, she may find it
harder, and less rewarding, to confront another hater.
Notice that:
1. The population state N^ ¼ ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ð0; 0; 1Þ –where all individuals play theN strategy–
is always a (strict) Nash equilibrium.
2. The population state H^ ¼ ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ð1; 0; 0Þ –where all individuals play theH strategy–
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if β> η.
3. The population state P^ ¼ ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ð0; 1; 0Þ –where all individuals play the P strategy–
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ε> γ, η.
4. The pure population states N^ , H^ , and P^ can simultaneously be Nash equilibria.
5. The payoff of each individual in the state N^ (given by η) is lower than the payoff of each
individual in the states H^ , and P^ (given, respectively, by β, and ε) when such states are Nash
equilibria.
6. The N strategy is never dominated by the other strategies. TheH strategy is dominated by N
if ηmax (β, γ), while it is dominated by P if β −δ and γ ε. Finally, the P strategy is
dominated by N if ε η, while it is dominated by H if β −δ and γ ε.
According to a well-known result in evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., [57]), if the pure
population states N^ , H^ , and P^ are Nash equilibria, then they also are (locally) attractive station-
ary states under every payoff-monotonic adoption dynamics of strategies. Consequently, in the
contexts in which N^ is not the unique existing Nash equilibrium, the adoption dynamics are
path dependent in that different stationary states may be reached starting from different initial
distributions (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) of strategies.
The stationary state N^ can be interpreted as a social poverty trap, in the sense of [9]; that is,
as an attractive stationary state where aggregate social participation and welfare (measured by
payoffs) fall to the lowest possible level with respect to other stationary states.
To focus our analysis on more relevant cases only, we shall study adoption dynamics under
the assumption that no strategy is dominated by others (see Point 6 above). Such assumption
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requires the following restrictions on parameters’ values:
ε > Z; maxðb; gÞ > Z; ð1Þ
either b >   d and g < ε or b <   d and g > ε ð2Þ
Notice that:
1. In the context in which β> −δ and γ> ε hold (see Eq (2)), also the state P^ ¼ ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼
ð0; 1; 0Þ –where all individuals play the P strategy–is a Nash equilibrium (and, therefore, a
locally attractive stationary state), while the state H^ ¼ ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ð1; 0; 0Þ –where all
individuals play theH strategy–may be a Nash equilibrium (this is the case only if β> η) or
not.
2. In the context in which β< −δ and γ> ε hold (see Eq (2)), the states P^ and H^ are never
Nash equilibria (and, therefore, they are never attractive). As we will see, such a context
favours the coexistence of theH and the P strategy. Importantly, this context captures an
interesting set of social scenarios: the first condition, β< −δ, requires that aH player is
more negatively affected by interacting withH players than what would happen to a P
player, suggesting that (i) haters do not get along with each other, possibly because they get
no satisfaction in the absence of a proper “victim” and/or are forced to take a taste of their
own medicine, whereas (ii) polite people are only mildly annoyed by interacting with haters.
On the other hand, the second condition, γ> ε, implies that interacting with P players is
more satisfactory for aH player than for another P player.
Evolutionary dynamics
Following [58], we assume that the diffusion of the three strategies is describedby the replicator
equations:
_x1 ¼ x1½PHðx1; x2Þ   Pðx1; x2; x3Þ ð3aÞ
_x2 ¼ x2½PPðx1; x2Þ   Pðx1; x2; x3Þ ð3bÞ
_x3 ¼ x3½PN   Pðx1; x2; x3Þ ð3cÞ
Where _x1, _x2, and _x3 represent the time derivatives of the functions x1(t), x2(t), and x3(t),
respectively, and:
P ¼ x1PH þ x2PP þ x3PN
is the population-wide average payoff of strategies.
Dynamics Eqs (3a, 3b and 3c) are defined in the simplex S illustrated in Fig 1, where x1, x2,
x3 0 and x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 hold.
According to replicator Eqs (3a, 3b and 3c), individuals tend to imitate players who adopt
the relatively more rewarding strategies. As a consequence, such strategies spread in the popu-
lation at the expenses of the less rewarding ones.
All the pure population states N^ , H^ , and P^ are stationary states under dynamics Eqs (3a, 3b
and 3c). Furthermore, the edges of S where one strategy is adopted by no one are invariant
under dynamics Eqs (3a, 3b and 3c); that is, every trajectory starting from a point belonging to
one of the edges, remains in the edge for every time t 2 (−1, +1). Replicator dynamics, and
any other payoff-monotonic dynamics, represent selection, as opposed tomutation, in the sense
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that they represent the selection process of present behaviors (pure strategies) via imitation of
the more rewarding ones, while absent behaviors remain absent ([57], p. 140). When a new
strategy enters the “market”, it can be adopted (imitated) by agents only if, at the initial time
t = 0, a strictly positive share of agents decide to adopt it. Initial strategy choices x1(0), x2(0), and
x3(0) are considered as exogenously determined and may be influenced by several factors.
Results
Classification of dynamic regimes
The analysis of systems (3a, 3b and 3c) builds on the classification results in Bomze [59]. It
allows us to give a complete classification of all the possible dynamic regimes that may be
observedunder systems (3a, 3b and 3c). The computations allowing us to apply Bomze’s classi-
fication to our model are very simple and we omit them (see [45], for an example of application
of Bomze’s classificationmethod).
The dynamic regimes that can be observed are illustrated in Fig 2a–2f. In these figures, a full
dot • represents a locally attractive stationary state, an empty dot  represents a repulsive sta-
tionary state, while a saddle point is indicated by drawing its insets and outsets (stable and
unstable manifolds, respectively). Only some representative trajectories are sketched. For sim-
plicity, in this classification, we omit consideration of non-robust dynamic regimes, that is, the
regimes observedonly if an equality condition on parameters' values holds. The dynamic
regimes that may be observed in the simplex S are the following:
Case 1: γ> ε (and therefore, by assumption Eq (2), β> −δ). We have two sub-cases:
1.a) If β> η, then all the stationary states N^ , H^ , and P^ are locally attractive. No other attractive
stationary state exists. Fig 2a and 2b illustrate the corresponding dynamic regimes. They
correspond, respectively, to phase portraits number 7 and 35 in Bomze’s classification (from
now on, we shall indicate the phase portrait number # of Bomze’s classification with the sym-
bol PP#).
The regime in Fig 2a is observed if the condition (ε − γ)(η − β) + (β + δ)(η − γ)< 0, that is:
Z <
bεþ gd
ε   gþ bþ d
ð4Þ
holds. The regime in Fig 2b is observed if the opposite of condition (4) holds.
1.b) If β< η, then the stationary states P^ and N^ are locally attractive, while H^ is a saddle point.
Fig 2c (respectively, Fig 2d) illustrates the dynamic regime occurring if condition (4)
(respectively, the opposite of Eq (4)) holds. Fig 2c and 2d correspond, respectively, to PP9
and PP37.
Case 2: γ> ε (and therefore, by assumption Eq (2), β< −δ). In this case, β< 0 holds and,
therefore, β< η. According to these conditions on parameters, the stationary state N^ is
locally attractive, H^ is repulsive and P^ is a saddle point. Furthermore, there exists another
locally attractive stationary state:
ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ðx

1
; 1   x
1
; 0Þ; x
1
¼
ε   g
ε   gþ bþ d
ð5Þ
if condition (4) holds. The stationary state Eq (5) lies in the edge of the simplex where only
strategiesH and P are played (Fig 2f, which corresponds to PP11). If the opposite of condi-
tion (4) holds, then N^ is the unique attractive stationary state and the dynamic regime is
that illustrated in Fig 2g (corresponding to PP36).
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Fig 2. The taxonomy of dynamic regimes. In these figures, a full dot • represents a locally attractive stationary state, an
empty dot  represents a repulsive stationary state, while a saddle point is indicated by drawing its insets and outsets.
Only some representative trajectories are sketched.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164286.g002
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Notice that, in Case 2 (γ> ε and β< −δ), ε − γ + β + δ< 0 holds and therefore the right
side of Eq (4) is positive if:
bεþ gd < 0 ð6Þ
To ease interpretation, condition (6) can be also expressed as γ / β> −ε / δ. This inequality
compares the ratio of marginal return whenmeeting a polite user or a hater for haters versus
polite users (abusing terminology, as a sort ofmarginal rate of substitution of haters vs. polites).
If Eq (6) holds, at the margin the rate at which haters are willing to forgo meeting one hater for
meeting a polite user is greater than the rate for polite users.
Welfare
Individuals’ payoffs in the pure population stationary states N^ , H^ and P^ are given respectively
by PP = η, PH(1, 0) = β and PP(0, 1) = ε; furthermore H^ and P^ are attractive if, respectively,
β> η and ε> γ, η hold. Consequently, individuals’ welfare in H^ and P^ is higher than in N^ ,
when H^ and P^ are attractive. However, the stability conditions concerning H^ and P^ do not
allow us to order them in terms of welfare.
In addition, in the stationary state ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ðx1; 1   x

1
; 0Þ, where only the strategiesH
and P are played (see Eq (5)), individuals’ payoff is given by:
PHðx

1
; 1   x
1
Þ ¼ PPðx

1
; 1   x
1
Þ ¼
bεþ gd
ε   gþ bþ d
ð7Þ
It is easy to check that:
ε ¼ PPð0; 1Þ > PHðx

1
; 1   x
1
Þ ¼ PPðx

1
; 1   x
1
Þ > PHð1; 0Þ ¼ b
holds: individuals’ welfare in ðx
1
; 1   x
1
; 0Þ is lower than in the stationary state P^ and higher
than in the stationary state H^ . Notice that condition (4) holds if and only if (see Eq (7)):
PHðx

1
; 1   x
1
Þ ¼ PPðx

1
; 1   x
1
Þ > PN ¼ Z
This implies that when the stationary state ðx
1
; 1   x
1
; 0Þ is attractive (this happens in Case
2, when condition (4) is satisfied), then individuals’ welfare in ðx
1
; 1   x
1
; 0Þ is higher than in
the social poverty trap N^ .
Discussion
In this paper we have built an evolutionary game model to study social interaction in a society
where social environment can become hostile due to the increase in the share of the population
adopting the self-protectiveN strategy (entailing the choice of social isolation) and the impolite
H strategy (entailing the adoption of an uncivil behavior in online interactions).
Our analysis showed that the three pure population stationary states N^ , H^ , and P^ , where all
individuals adopt the same strategy (respectivelyN,H, and P), can be simultaneously attractive
only if β> −δ and γ> ε hold. In such a context, no attractive stationary state in which two or
three strategies are played exist. The coexistence between strategies can only be observedwhen
β< −δ and γ> ε. In such a context, an attractive stationary state ðx1; x2; x3Þ ¼ ðx1; 1   x

1
; 0Þ,
where only the strategiesH and P are played, can exist. The first condition, β< −δ, requires that a
H player is more negatively affected by interacting with otherH players than what would happen
to a P player, suggesting that (i) haters do not get along with each other, possibly because they get
no satisfaction in the absence of proper “victims” and/or are forced to take a taste of their own
Civility vs. Incivility in Online Social Interactions
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0164286 November 1, 2016 13 / 17
medicine, whereas (ii) polite people are only mildly annoyed by interacting with haters. On the
other hand, the second condition, γ> ε, implies that interacting with P players is more satisfac-
tory for aH player than for a P player. Our results suggest that politeness can survive in a world
with a fair share of haters only if the payoffs of polite people are not heavily affected by haters.
Thus it would seem that Internet users engaged with haters need to heed the same advice Virgil
gave Dante upon entering Hell: “Let us not speak of them, but do thou look and pass on”.
Whatever the parameter configuration is, the stationary state N^ is always locally attractive,
while those entailing positive levels of participation (that is, the stationary states H^ , P^ and
ðx
1
; 1   x
1
; 0Þ) can be attractive or not, according to the configuration of parameters. When
this happens, they always give higher payoffs than the social poverty trap N^ .
The destination of dynamics strictly depends on the initial distribution of the strategies in
the population. This path dependence suggests that societies that are similar along a number of
fundamental features can converge to different equilibria depending on their initial distribu-
tion of strategies (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)). Policies aimed at modifying individual payoffs might not
be sufficient to prevent social poverty traps. From an institutional perspective, what could pol-
icy makers do to help people out of complete isolation and restore social interactions? Should
governments intervene, or are there market forces that could be leveraged to do so? [9] exten-
sively argue for the need for complementary actions between governments and civil society.
However, this model is pessimistic about the role of civil society;when a social trap forms, the
whole population converges to the pure strategy equilibrium N^ , without any convenient indi-
vidual deviation. The dissemination of information on the existence of incivility online and the
reasons why it can be a serious problem for society should be of primary concern for policy
makers, SNS managers and users alike. Therefore the government should probably enforce pol-
icies to prevent defensive self-isolating behaviors (e.g., school education on SNS and how to
react to incivility) or to re-establish social connections (e.g., free public events, public goods
with a social component). Future research should shed light on these issues.
In addition, future research might consider relaxing the mean-field assumption we adopted
in our framework. In our model, the interaction between the various types of player mostly
happens randomly. However, socialization is often driven by the tendency of individuals to
associate and bond with similar others. While homophily commonly concerns socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, opinions and interests (see, for example, [60]–[61]), the strategies of
online interaction we consider in this paper only focus on the personality traits determining
whether an individual will behave politely or rudely on SNS–whatever her socio-demographic
characteristics, opinions and interests are. This assumption can be justified by the fact that we
do not model interactions in friendship networks, where homophily plays a crucial role, but we
model random face-to-face daily interactions and interactions in SNS. These last ones involve
friends, friends of friends and a large amount of agents with whom any SNS user randomly
interacts. In our stylized framework, even assuming homophily to play a role, this would likely
happen along the dimensions of gender, ethnicity, preferences and tastes, instead of the dimen-
sions described by our strategies, which depend on deeper personality traits that are likely to be
orthogonal to the drivers of homophily. Future research should address the role of homophily
by analysing how the P and theH strategies interact with other users’ personal features such as,
for example, their opinions. Uncivil behavior, in fact, is more likely to occur among individuals
with different preferences or tastes. Homophily along specific preferences (concerning, for
example, political issues) could impact the diffusion of the Polite and the Hate strategies in the
population by encouraging the formation of segregated communities in which the Polite strat-
egy could be much more profitable. This form of segregation could decrease online networks’
potential to contribute to the diffusion of knowledge and information.
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